Add solution for 5k
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exam/ex.tex
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exam/ex.tex
@ -332,7 +332,24 @@
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Futhermore, the commitment is also not vulnerable to dictionary attacks,
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as is common with stored password hashes on the server's side.
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\item \TODO
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\item The signer calculates a commitment with a predefined soundness error.
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Then the signer calculates the challenge by taking the hash of the message
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to be signed and the commitment. Afterwards, it will run the protocol
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again and calculate a response for the created challenge (hash) and the
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commitment. The signature is a tuple of the commitment and the response.
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The verifier can calculate the challenge on its own from the message and
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the commitment and then verifies that the response matches the commitment
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for that challenge. If it does, the signature is valid, otherwise it is
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invalid.
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The signature is $\mathsf{EUF}$-$\mathsf{CMA}$ secure if
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$\mathsf{ID}_{\mathrm{CGI2}}$ satisfies special soundness and honest
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verifier zero-knowledge, which it does. Futhermore, it is secure if the
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attacker has a negligible probability of finding a valid signature for a
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message which has not been queried before. This rests on the fact that
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finding an isomorphism for a specific commitment and challenge which
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matches the response is hard.
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\item \TODO
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