\documentclass[a4paper]{article} \usepackage[english]{babel} \usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm} \usepackage{color} \usepackage{units} \newcommand{\TODO}{\textcolor{red}{TO DO}} \begin{document} \begin{center} \textbf{\Large NWI-IMC061 -- Applied Cryptography}\\[4pt] \textbf{\large Final Exam, Academic Year 2021--2022} \end{center} \bigskip \hrule \bigskip \noindent \textbf{Last Name:} Eidelpes \medskip\noindent \textbf{First Name:} Tobias \medskip\noindent \textbf{Student Number:} s1090746 \medskip\noindent \textbf{Personalized Appendix Sequence Number:} 30 \bigskip \hrule \bigskip \begin{enumerate} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%% SYMMETRIC - LITERATURE %%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \item \textbf{(18 points)} \begin{enumerate} \item EWCDM stands for \emph{Encrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer}. As the name implies, EWCDM is based on a Wegman-Carter construction which takes the hash of a message $M$ and XORes it with the application of a pseudorandom function (PRF) to a nonce $N$. This construction is very efficient and also has a strong security bound. However, it is very vulnerable to \emph{nonce-misuse}. To deal with that problem, the Wegman-Carter construction is wrapped by another call to the PRF with a different key. Another disadvantage is the fact that PRFs are hard to get by and instead pseudorandom permutations are used. If a pseudorandom permutation (i.e. block cipher) is used, the security bound of the construction drops to the birthday bound ($2^{n/2}$). The authors replace the inner call to the PRF with the \emph{Davies-Meyer} construction \[ \mathrm{DM}[E]_K(N) = E_K(N)\oplus N \] and then encrypt that (with the hashed message) in another call to the block cipher. The resulting EWCDM construction looks like this \[ E_{K'}(E_K(N)\oplus N\oplus H_{K_h}(M)) \] and is secure \emph{beyond} the birthday bound against nonce-respecting adversaries while still offering birthday bound security against nonce-misusing adversaries. \item The type of symmetric cryptographic scheme introduced is a Message Authentication Code (MAC). \item The size of the key(s) depends on the block cipher and the keyed hash function. In total there likely need to be two distinct keys for the block cipher calls and one key for the hash function. \item Since EWCDM is based on a block cipher and a hash function and because those usually operate on fixed-length inputs, the construction also operates on fixed-length inputs. Messages come in variable-length sizes and need to be padded by the block cipher to the specified block size. \item Depending on the amount of input blocks, the construction will generate multiples of the block size as outputs. The outputs are variable-length. \item EWCDM is based on a pseudorandom permutation (i.e. block cipher) and an almost xor-universal (AXU) hash function (one-way function). \item Yes, the authors delivered a security proof. The proof assumes that the encryption function $E$ is a secure pseudorandom permutation for the case of a nonce-misusing adversary. This requirement on the security of $E$ is not present if the adversary is nonce-respecting. Additionally, the distinguisher is computationally unbounded and never repeats a query. \item The practical relevance is high, in my opinion. This is due to the fact that the EWCDM construction is secure against nonce-misusing adversaries up to the birthday bound. It has been shown that implementing nonces securely is a difficult task. If a scheme is easily broken by wrong handling of nonces, there is no \emph{fallback} security guarantee. The EWCDM construction, however, provides such a \emph{fallback} security guarantee and is of high practical relevance. \item Poly1305 is also a message authentication code (MAC), which we discussed in the lecture. \item One advantage of EWCDM over Poly1305 is that the former is nonce-misuse resistant up to the birthday bound while Poly1305 is not. \item One disadvantage of EWCDM is that it requires two calls to the underlying block cipher. This can have potentially serious performance implications for small, low-resource embedded devices. \end{enumerate} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%% SYMMETRIC - KEYED %%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \item \textbf{(16 points)} \begin{enumerate} \item $\mathsf{CrAp}_K^{-1}$ operates by taking the ciphertexts $C_1,\cdots,C_l$ and passing them to the decryption function $\widetilde{E}^{-1}(K,N,\cdot)$. The decryption function takes 128-bit inputs and produces a 128-bit output. The output has to be stripped of the counter (the last 26 bits) to obtain the 102-bit message block $M_1,\cdots,M_l$. Finally, the padding (if any) has to be removed from $M_1,\cdots,M_l$ to obtain the original message block (102 bits). \item The length of the message $M$ is limited by the counter, which is at most 26 bits long. Since the very first counter ($\langle 0\rangle_{26}$) is reserved for the tag, $2^{26}-2$ message blocks remain. Every block (without the counter) is at most 102 bits long which gives a maximum message length of $102\cdot (2^{26}-2) = \unit[6845103924]{bits}$. \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \end{enumerate} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%% SYMMETRIC - UNKEYED %%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \item \textbf{(16 points)} \begin{enumerate} \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \end{enumerate} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%% ASYMMETRIC - LITERATURE %%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \item \textbf{(17 points)} \begin{enumerate} \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \end{enumerate} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%% ASYMMETRIC - SECURITY %%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \item \textbf{(33 points)} \begin{enumerate} \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \item \TODO \end{enumerate} \end{enumerate} \end{document}