348 lines
15 KiB
TeX
348 lines
15 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage[english]{babel}
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm}
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\usepackage{color}
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\usepackage{units}
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\newcommand{\TODO}{\textcolor{red}{TO DO}}
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\begin{document}
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\begin{center}
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\textbf{\Large NWI-IMC061 -- Applied Cryptography}\\[4pt]
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\textbf{\large Final Exam, Academic Year 2021--2022}
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\end{center}
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\bigskip
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\hrule
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\bigskip
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\noindent \textbf{Last Name:} Eidelpes
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\medskip\noindent \textbf{First Name:} Tobias
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\medskip\noindent \textbf{Student Number:} s1090746
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\medskip\noindent \textbf{Personalized Appendix Sequence Number:} 30
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\bigskip
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\hrule
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\bigskip
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\begin{enumerate}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%% SYMMETRIC - LITERATURE %%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\item \textbf{(18 points)}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item EWCDM stands for \emph{Encrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer}. As
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the name implies, EWCDM is based on a Wegman-Carter construction which
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takes the hash of a message $M$ and XORes it with the application of a
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pseudorandom function (PRF) to a nonce $N$. This construction is very
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efficient and also has a strong security bound. However, it is very
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vulnerable to \emph{nonce-misuse}. To deal with that problem, the
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Wegman-Carter construction is wrapped by another call to the PRF with a
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different key. Another disadvantage is the fact that PRFs are hard to get
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by and instead pseudorandom permutations are used. If a pseudorandom
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permutation (i.e. block cipher) is used, the security bound of the
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construction drops to the birthday bound ($2^{n/2}$). The authors replace
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the inner call to the PRF with the \emph{Davies-Meyer} construction
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\[ \mathrm{DM}[E]_K(N) = E_K(N)\oplus N \]
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and then encrypt that (with the hashed message) in another call to the
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block cipher. The resulting EWCDM construction looks like this
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\[ E_{K'}(E_K(N)\oplus N\oplus H_{K_h}(M)) \]
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and is secure \emph{beyond} the birthday bound against nonce-respecting
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adversaries while still offering birthday bound security against
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nonce-misusing adversaries.
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\item The type of symmetric cryptographic scheme introduced is a Message
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Authentication Code (MAC).
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\item The size of the key(s) depends on the block cipher and the keyed hash
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function. In total there likely need to be two distinct keys for the block
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cipher calls and one key for the hash function.
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\item Since EWCDM is based on a block cipher and a hash function and because
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those usually operate on fixed-length inputs, the construction also
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operates on fixed-length inputs. Messages come in variable-length sizes
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and need to be padded by the block cipher to the specified block size.
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\item Depending on the amount of input blocks, the construction will
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generate multiples of the block size as outputs. The outputs are
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variable-length.
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\item EWCDM is based on a pseudorandom permutation (i.e. block cipher) and
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an almost xor-universal (AXU) hash function (one-way function).
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\item Yes, the authors delivered a security proof. The proof assumes that
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the encryption function $E$ is a secure pseudorandom permutation for the
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case of a nonce-misusing adversary. This requirement on the security of
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$E$ is not present if the adversary is nonce-respecting. Additionally, the
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distinguisher is computationally unbounded and never repeats a query.
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\item The practical relevance is high, in my opinion. This is due to the
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fact that the EWCDM construction is secure against nonce-misusing
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adversaries up to the birthday bound. It has been shown that implementing
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nonces securely is a difficult task. If a scheme is easily broken by wrong
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handling of nonces, there is no \emph{fallback} security guarantee. The
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EWCDM construction, however, provides such a \emph{fallback} security
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guarantee and is of high practical relevance.
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\item Poly1305 is also a message authentication code (MAC), which we
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discussed in the lecture.
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\item One advantage of EWCDM over Poly1305 is that the former is
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nonce-misuse resistant up to the birthday bound while Poly1305 is not.
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\item One disadvantage of EWCDM is that it requires two calls to the
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underlying block cipher. This can have potentially serious performance
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implications for small, low-resource embedded devices.
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\end{enumerate}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%% SYMMETRIC - KEYED %%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\item \textbf{(16 points)}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item $\mathsf{CrAp}_K^{-1}$ operates by taking the ciphertexts
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$C_1,\cdots,C_l$ and passing them to the decryption function
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$\widetilde{E}^{-1}(K,N,\cdot)$. The decryption function takes 128-bit
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inputs and produces a 128-bit output. The output has to be stripped of the
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counter (the last 26 bits) to obtain the 102-bit message block
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$M_1,\cdots,M_l$. Finally, the padding (if any) has to be removed from
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$M_1,\cdots,M_l$ to obtain the original message block (102 bits).
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\item The length of the message $M$ is limited by the counter, which is at
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most 26 bits long. Since the very first counter ($\langle 0\rangle_{26}$)
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is reserved for the tag, $2^{26}-2$ message blocks remain. Every block
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(without the counter) is at most 102 bits long which gives a maximum
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message length of $102\cdot (2^{26}-2) = \unit[6845103924]{bits}$.
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\item $\widetilde{E}$ should behave like a pseudorandom permutation in order
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to be able to prove the security of $\mathsf{CrAp}$. If it does not, a
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distinguisher is able to gain a significant advantage because the block
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cipher does not actually generate \emph{random} outputs. Further, if the
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security of the underlying primitive is broken, the whole scheme falls
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apart.
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item The length of the random nonce $N$ is $\unit[96]{bits}$. The expected
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number of evaluations an attacker has to make to obtain a repeated nonce
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is $2^{96/2} = 2^{48}$.
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\item After $2^b = 2^{62}$ forgery attempts, the attacker has exhausted the
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keyspace of the tag because the tag $T$ is of size $\unit[62]{bits}$. The
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distinguisher checks continuously if the current tag matches the
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ciphertext. If it does not, the tag is incremented by one until $2^{62}$
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queries have been made. Eventually, the distinguisher will get the valid
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tag and is then able to identify if it is in the real world or in the
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ideal world.
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\item \TODO
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\end{enumerate}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%% SYMMETRIC - UNKEYED %%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\item \textbf{(16 points)}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item The chaining value size is $\unit[101]{bits}$ ($=g$) and the message
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block size is $655-101=\unit[554]{bits}$.
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\item If the message is of size $|M|=\unit[1234567]{bits}$ and the block
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size is $\unit[554]{bits}$, we need $\frac{1234866}{554}=2229$ blocks with
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a padding of $1234866-1234567=\unit[299]{bits}$. Additionally, the
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message length is also encoded in a $\unit[554]{bit}$ block and so the
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total number of blocks is $2230$. The total number of blocks corresponds
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to the total number of evaluations needed, which is $2230$ evaluations of
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$P$.
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\item In order for $(x,y)$ to be a valid preimage for the compression
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function $F^P$, $x$ must be of size $\unit[655]{bits}$ ($=e$ in the
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diagram) and $y$ must be of size $\unit[101]{bits}$. Furthermore, the
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following condition must be true: $[F^P(x)=y]\vee [F^P(y)=x]$.
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\end{enumerate}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%% ASYMMETRIC - LITERATURE %%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\item \textbf{(17 points)}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item LEDAcrypt is a post-quantum asymmetric suite of cryptosystems. It
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contains a public-key encryption scheme and a key-encapsulation mechanism
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(KEM). The underlying hard problem (arbitrary linear binary code decoding)
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is currently believed to be secure against quantum adversaries.
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\item The authors introduce a post-quantum public-key cryptosystem based on
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linear codes.
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\item IND-CCA2 is proven for both the KEM and the PKC. IND-CPA is proven for
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the KEM.
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\item LEDAcrypt is based on the hardness of the decoding problem for linear
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codes. Given a parity-check matrix $H$ and a received codeword $y$, the
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syndrome is $s=yH$. The best estimate for the received codeword is
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$x=y+z_0$. Find a minimum-weight solution $z_0$ for the equation $s=zH$.
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Finding a minimum-weight solution to $s=zH$ given $s$ and $H$ is
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$\mathsf{NP}$-hard.
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\item The private key in LEDAcrypt consists of two binary matrices $Q$ and
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$H$. The public key is constructed from the matrix $L=Q\cdot H$. The
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security of the scheme relies on the fact that obtaining the original
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information from a perturbed codeword is hard unless the factorization of
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the public key ($Q\cdot H$) is known. If the aforementioned problem of
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decoding linear codes has a polynomial-time solution, an attacker will
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also easily be able to obtain the factorization of the public key. If that
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was possible, the scheme would be broken.
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\item The strongest type of security the authors claim to achieve is
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IND-CCA2. The authors use the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to achieve
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IND-CCA2 security.
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\item The scheme can be used to exchange symmetric keys between parties
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with the usage of the key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). In that scenario,
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the sender encrypts a symmetric key with LEDAcrypt and shares the
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encrypted key with the other party. The other party then decrypts the
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message to obtain the symmetric key which can be used for further
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communication.
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\item The lowest security level treated by the authors is level 1 of the
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NIST security levels corresponding to AES-128. The parameters depend on
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whether the scheme is used for ephemeral or long-term keys and what kind
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of code rate ($n_0$) is needed. For ephemeral keys with $n_0=2$ the
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authors suggest values of: $p=14,939$, $t=136$, $d_v=11$ and $m=[4,3]$.
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For long-term keys the authors suggest values of: $p=35,899$, $t=136$,
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$d_v=9$, $m=[5,4]$, $\overline{t}=4$ and $b_0=44$. These parameters are
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chosen with respect to an adversary using Information Set Decoding (ISD)
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to find a solution to the underlying hard problem.
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\item The size for ephemeral keys is $\unit[452]{bytes}$ (in memory) for the
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private key and $\unit[1872]{bytes}$ for the public key. The size for
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long-term keys is $\unit[468]{bytes}$ (in memory) for the private key and
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$\unit[4488]{bytes}$ for the public key.
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\item Kyber512 is also a KEM and achieves the same level of (classical)
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security.
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\item One advantage of LEDAcrypt is that the key sizes are relatively small
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compared to Classic McEliece, for example. Small key sizes are important
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for transmission of public keys so that they can fit in commonly used
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packet sizes.
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\item One disadvantage of the scheme is that it inherently has a non-zero
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decoding failure rate (DFR). For ephemeral keys and the lowest security
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level, the authors advertise an error probability of $14$ out of $1.2\cdot
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10^9$ decodes. The DFR can be lowered by choosing different parameters,
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but the rate is arguably still too high for practical use.
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For long term keys the authors state that 95 out of 100 keys (lowest
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security level) provide a DFR of $2^{-64}$, which is also arguably too low
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for extended use well into the future.
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\end{enumerate}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%% ASYMMETRIC - SECURITY %%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\item \textbf{(33 points)}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item If $G_{ch}=\phi_{ch}(G)$ and $G'=\psi(G)$, it follows that
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$G=\phi_{ch}^{-1}(G_{ch})$ and therefore $G'=\psi(\phi_{ch}^{-1}(G_{ch}))$
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so the verifier will always accept.
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\item Suppose $G_{ch}$ is not isomorphic to $G$. $\mathcal{P}$ prepares in
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advance for a challenge $ch^*$ and so
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$G'=\psi(\phi_{ch^*}^{-1}(G_{ch^*}))$. $\mathcal{P}$ commits to $G'$. If
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the challenge by $V$ is $ch^*$ (so $ch=ch^*$), $\mathcal{V}$ accepts,
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otherwise it rejects. Because $ch\in\{0,\dots,2^{130}-1\}$, the
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probability that $\mathcal{P}$ convinces $\mathcal{V}$ is
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$1/2^{130}$ (soundness error).
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\item The soundness error after one iteration is $1/2^{130}$. To achieve
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a $1/2^{192}$ soundness error, the protocol should be done twice to arrive
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at a soundness error of $1/2^{260}$, which is well below the required
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$1/2^{192}$.
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\item A simulator $\mathcal{S}$ is built as follows:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item $\mathcal{S}$ starts $\mathcal{V}^*$ with $G_i$ and
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$i\in\{0,\dots,2^{130}-1\}$.
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\item $\mathcal{S}$ makes a guess $\mathsf{ch}^*$ and calculates
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$G'\leftarrow\psi(\phi_{ch^*}^{-1}(G_{ch^*}))$.
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\item $\mathcal{S}$ gets a challenge $\mathsf{ch}$ from $\mathcal{V}^*$.
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If $\mathsf{ch}=\mathsf{ch}^*$, $\mathcal{S}$ outputs
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$(G',\mathsf{ch}^*,\phi_{ch^*}^{-1}\psi)$. If
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$\mathsf{ch}\neq\mathsf{ch}^*$, $\mathcal{S}$ rewinds $\mathcal{V}^*$
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and goes to step 2.
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\end{itemize}
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The simular $\mathcal{S}$ is expected probabilistic polynomial-time with
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$2^{130}n$ time and the protocol is zero-knowledge.
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\item For completeness see 5e.
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Special soundness: given two accepting transcripts for the same commitment
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$\mathsf{trans} = (G',\mathsf{ch},\phi_{ch}^{-1}\psi)$ and $\mathsf{trans}'
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= (G',\mathsf{ch'},\phi_{ch'}^{-1}\psi)$ we have \[ \psi =
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\frac{\mathsf{resp}-\mathsf{resp}'}{\phi_{ch}^{-1}-\phi_{ch'}^{-1}} \] which
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means that the witness can be extracted with probability 1.
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For special HVZK: given $\mathsf{ch}\in\{0,\dots,2^{130}-1\}$ choose
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$\mathsf{resp}\xleftarrow{\$}\mathcal{I}_{1107}$ and calculate
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$G'\leftarrow\mathsf{resp}(G_{ch})$. The distributions of real transcripts
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and simulated transcripts are the same. A given valid transcript occurs with
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probability $1/2^{130}$.
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\item $\mathsf{ID}_{\mathrm{CGI2}}$ can be used for authentication if a
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client (prover) proves to a server (verifier) the possession of a password
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without actually revealing it. The client shares a commitment with the
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server and as soon as the client wants to log-in, it receives a challenge
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from the server. If the client can successfully pass the challenge (i.e.,
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the response from the client is equal to the commitment), it is
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authenticated with the server.
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The advantage of such a scheme over conventional password-based
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authentication is that the secret is never transmitted to anyone.
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Futhermore, the commitment is also not vulnerable to dictionary attacks,
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as is common with stored password hashes on the server's side.
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\item \TODO
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\end{enumerate}
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\end{enumerate}
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\end{document}
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