diff --git a/paper/references.bib b/paper/references.bib
index cdd5579..2ac6895 100644
--- a/paper/references.bib
+++ b/paper/references.bib
@@ -65,7 +65,6 @@
   doi = {10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005},
   abstract = {Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest ``approval''. It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral. We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least 1n, where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents, and prove a weaker statement.},
   journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
-  language = {en},
   number = {2}
 }
 
@@ -73,8 +72,7 @@
   title = {Funding {{Public Projects}}: {{A Case}} for the {{Nash Product Rule}}},
   author = {Brandl, Florian and Brandt, Felix and Peters, Dominik and Stricker, Christian and Suksompong, Warut},
   year = {2020},
-  pages = {20},
-  language = {en}
+  pages = {20}
 }
 
 @book{brandtHandbookComputationalSocial2016,
@@ -99,7 +97,6 @@
   doi = {10.1177/095624780401600104},
   abstract = {This paper describes participatory budgeting in Brazil and elsewhere as a significant area of innovation in democracy and local development. It draws on the exp...},
   journal = {Environment and Urbanization},
-  language = {en},
   number = {1}
 }
 
@@ -114,7 +111,6 @@
   doi = {10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009},
   abstract = {We consider methods of electing a fixed number of candidates, greater than one, by approval ballot. We define a representativeness property and a Pareto property and show that these jointly imply manipulability.},
   journal = {Economics Letters},
-  language = {en},
   number = {1}
 }
 
@@ -129,7 +125,6 @@
   address = {{Berlin, Heidelberg}},
   doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-54110-4_27},
   abstract = {In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating preferences to determine an allocation of funds to projects. We argue that the classic game theoretic notion of core captures fairness in the setting. To compute the core, we first develop a novel characterization of a public goods market equilibrium called the Lindahl equilibrium. We then provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing such an equilibrium for a broad set of utility functions. We empirically show that the core can be efficiently computed for utility functions that naturally model data from real participatory budgeting instances, and examine the relation of the core with the welfare objective. Finally, we address concerns of incentives and mechanism design by developing a randomized approximately dominant-strategy truthful mechanism building on the Exponential Mechanism from differential privacy.},
-  language = {en},
   series = {Lecture {{Notes}} in {{Computer Science}}}
 }
 
@@ -243,7 +238,6 @@
   abstract = {We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally.},
   copyright = {Copyright (c) 2019 Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence},
   journal = {Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
-  language = {en},
   number = {01}
 }